‘But the real problem is….’ : The chameleonic insidiousness of ‘overpopulation’ in the environmental humanities. by Clark,  Timothy
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
02 October 2017
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Clark, Timothy (2016) '`But the real problem is. . . .' : The chameleonic insidiousness of `overpopulation' in the
environmental humanities.', Oxford literary review., 38 (1). pp. 7-26.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.3366/olr.2016.0177
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Edinburgh University Press in Oxford Literary Review. The
Version of Record is available online at: http://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/olr.2016.0177.
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
  
 ‘But the real problem is….’: The Chameleonic Insidiousness of ‘Overpopulation’ in the 
Environmental Humanities 
 
TIMOTHY CLARK 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 There is a pervasive, usually unconsidered gesture in most environmental thinking and criticism. 
This is that its work means the isolation of some phenomenon that can then be argued to be the 
primary cause of environmental degradation. For some, overpopulation seems the self-evident 
issue, for others the dynamics of consumer capitalism, for others the underlying cultural contexts 
of patriarchy, or colonial or neo-colonial attitudes to nature, and so on.  
   However, as more and more nonhuman agencies interact in badly understood ways with 
increasingly obtrusive  human actions, environmental degradation becomes less a matter of 
unitary or even discernibly plural causes, and more  the emergent effect of the combination of 
numerous interacting issues of a hybrid kind, comprising capitalism, population pressure, 
technological innovation per se, deforestation, neo-colonialism, and cultural norms (such as 
those of patriarchy), along with such capricious material factors such as levels of  methane from 
thawing ground in Siberia, soil degradation, the varying reflectivity of clouds.… Here, 
increasingly, there may seem to be no one localizable or unitary, root ‘real problem’ at all. 
Instead, these phenomena—warming tundra, deforestation, overpopulation, human flourishing 
and excessive resource use— create together an obscure whole, alarming and only partially 
knowable. Complexity has become, as it were, the underlying environmental meta-problem. One 
sign of this opaque complexity is the proliferation and now becoming-cliché of the term 
‘Anthropocene’, for the one word forms a convenient but also masking shorthand for 
innumerable uncertainly related phenomena.  
   The issues gathered under the heading ‘overpopulation’ instantiate, as if in miniature, this 
complexity at its most intellectually and morally intractable, so much so that many thinkers seem 
to prefer to overlook it altogether. A representative example of how such complexity unfolds is 
‘The Population Delusion’, a New Scientist special feature of 26th Sept 2009 (35-4), a series of 
current, differing arguments on the relation of human population growth to environmental 
degradation. The editors’ introduction observes: ‘Every time we publish an article in New 
Scientist detailing yet another of the planet’s environmental woes, readers respond by arguing 
that the real problem is overpopulation’ (35). The New Scientist special has 4 main 
features/arguments. The first is by thinkers and activists for ever associated with arguments 
about a ‘Population Bomb’ from the 1970s. Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich directly correlate the 
increased resource needs of the ever expanding human population with increased malnutrition, 
poverty, poor education and environmental degradation, arguing   that unevasive global debate  
is urgently needed on acceptable measures for slowing and then reversing human population 
growth,  and that ‘it should be considered immoral to have excessive numbers of children’ (37). 
In the next paper the ‘techno-optimist’ Jesse Asuble projects a world in which improved 
agricultural and conservation measures could enable an ecologically healthy planet to sustain 
even 20 billion people. In effect, as in many other  arguments against the so-called ‘population 
myth’, 1  the real issue is said to be the full application of science, of matching technological 
know-how and wisdom to the stresses of demography, for, refuting the arch-, early Nineteenth 
Century populationalist Thomas Malthus, ‘the world’s food supply has steadily increased in 
something like “geometrical” proportion; and with the help of agricultural technology and human 
ingenuity, food supplies can continue to increase in tandem with population’ (Howard P. Kainz). 
2 In the third paper Fred Pearce writes that ‘The real issue is not overpopulation but 
overconsumption—mostly in rich countries that have long since given up adding substantial 
numbers to their population’ (40). Pearce expresses what is also the dominant view in 
environmental criticism and the humanities more generally. Finally and more parochially, Reiner 
Klinholz, focuses on Europe alone to argue that the ‘biggest challenge’ will be the social and 
economic demands of an aging population (41).  
    Considerations of effects of overpopulation at the global level are necessarily a matter of 
statistics, demographic projections, and ecological models, with each entailing debates about the 
nature and the effects of different social, political and economic arrangements, all on varying 
time scales. One effect of such a  complexity of factors is that  it becomes  hard to imagine any 
specific environmental issue in which effects of population pressure could not seem resolvable  
into something else in each individual case: poor farmers rushing in to exploit land cleared by 
excessive foresting can clearly-- and justly in each individual case-- be  argued to be responding 
to a  lack of livelihood options (the ‘real problem’ is poverty);  overcrowding in conditions of 
urban squalor can be justly be argued to be confusing crowding in one place with the issue of too 
many people globally—the ‘real problem’ is the impoverishment of rural life, and systems of 
economics that favour large agglomerations. In each case, overpopulation can even seem a 
morally obnoxious theme to highlight, evasive of other causes of environmental degradation, 
tantamount to saying ‘the problem here is that these people exist’. 
      Thus it is that in the humanities the complexity of environmental questions has had the ironic 
effect of enabling intellectual simplification, even evasion, when it comes to issues of 
population. The temptation is easy to feel, given the associations of this issue with coercive 
measures of population control in China and India, along with its immediate intrusion into areas 
of ‘private’ life, such as family size, and its perceived threat to women’s rights etc.. It has 
seemed far more straightforward to sidestep this part of the complex of factors destroying the 
former biosphere of the Holocene in favour of others, more morally comfortable to engage with -
- such as issues of human equity, anthropocentrism, capitalist oppression, patriarchy. To use the 
search function on the website of the leading journal of ecocriticism, ISLE, is to find, since 
foundation of the journal in 1993, ‘overpopulation’ mentioned occasionally but almost never 
discussed. Even the issue of 2014 devoted to ecocriticism in China with its notorious and now 
revised One Child Policy, contains only the most cursory, passing mention of population.3 
          The chameleonic insidiousness of overpopulation is always to seem resolvable into 
something more comfortable to categorise, and so escape adequate acknowledgment. Ursula 
Heise’s chapter on novels concerning population pressure in Sense of Planet Sense of Place 
argues that dystopian scenarios like some of J.G. Ballard’s are really depictions of overcrowding 
in an urban space (i.e. a different issue from global overpopulation). The real issue here could 
rather be said to be that of sometimes class-based anxieties about personal space and identity. 4 
Andreu Domingo’s survey of ‘demodystopsias’, as he calls them, finds that, at worst, novels 
continue the eugenicist scenarios associated with demography in the first half of the twentieth 
century, and express elitist fears of being swamped by ‘the masses’, or of ‘hordes’ of Asians 
overrunning America or Australia, and so on. 5 The challenge for critical engagement may be 
this: to acknowledge the dubious cultural politics which Heise, Domingo and others trace in so 
many literary texts that present themselves as engaging with demographic change, without, 
however, allowing the impression that highlighting the social prejudice in many representations 
is adequate to dispel issues of global overpopulation altogether. This would mean, for example, 
that Mia Jian’s novel Dark Road (2012) 6 can be acknowledged in its force of protest against 
individual injustice in relation to China’s One Child Policy, without at the same time making any 
pretense that celebration of this book in any way implies that the question of global 
overpopulation has thereby been adequately, or even directly engaged. Valid arguments about 
injustice and economic equity should not do double duty as forms of population denialism. 
     It now seems increasingly to be recognised in the environmental humanities that 
overpopulation is a topic which demands a more adequate stance. Dipesh Chakravorty has 
recently highlighted it as a problem that does not resolve into a subset of standard postcolonial 
arguments about the effects of imperialism or expanding Western capitalism: 
 
Population is often the elephant in the room in discussions of climate change. The ‘problem’ of 
population –while due surely in part to modern medicine, public health measures, eradication of 
epidemics, the use of artificial fertilisers, and so on –cannot be attributed in any straightforward 
way to a logic of a predatory and capitalist West, for neither China nor India pursued unbridled 
capitalism while their populations exploded. 7  
 
Since overpopulation is fed by some developments that only a psychopath would wish reversed 
(improved health etc.), one can understand why Braden R. Allenby and Daniel Sarewitz’s study 
of present and future social and technological challenges effectively, if evasively, describes 
overpopulation as condition to be inhabited rather than any sort of problem to be solved. 8 
   Is this merely a kind of fatalism, however? Diana Coole ends a survey of debates on the issue 
of overpopulation with the following conclusion: 
 
 [there are] not good enough reasons for suppressing discussion about population numbers and 
the merits of fewer people, especially as renewed public concerns emerge over resource 
insecurity, biodiversity, climate change and high-density urban living, but suppression of the 
issue has been such that it still seems unlikely to get the attention it needs. 9  
 
Reasons to try to look at ‘overpopulation’ head-on. 
 
Partly following Coole’s lead, it may be helpful to reiterate why overpopulation, as an 
environmental issue, ought to be more directly addressed.  
     (1) A first point is the interrelation of capitalism and population, and the fact that 
overpopulation directly feeds the needs of ever expanding markets.  So-called developed 
countries like Britain, with an ‘expanding economy’ and aging population, demand an ever-
renewed stream of new workers and consumers. The attendant increase in economic activity also 
provides the most easily achieved statistics of economic ‘success’, increased GDP. Conversely, 
overpopulation in many parts of world supports poverty by reducing the bargaining power of 
labour. In sum, for environmental criticism to ignore overpopulation is to pass over a crucial way 
in which capitalism works and expands.   
 
    (2) A second closely related issue concerns the environmental costs hidden in the now 
standard, ‘optimistic’ response to projected future population numbers—the appeal to 
interpretations  of the ‘demographic transition’ model currently dominant in demography. 10 The 
model is effectively a theory of modernisation, even another ‘end of history’ narrative. It projects 
a process whereby ‘undeveloped’ societies with initially both high mortality and high fertility 
rates are seen to mutate through first, a phase of enhanced development and reduced mortality 
leading to rapid population growth (the phase occupied by much of the world at present), but 
then to developed conditions enabling reduced fertility, resulting finally in a higher but stable 
population at rough equilibrium (the phase already achieved by developed nations).  In political 
practice, this theory is taken up crudely as a way of dismissing population concerns, with 
arguments that ‘development is the best contraceptive’. 11 Increased economic security, backed 
up by the increased freedom of women to make their own reproductive choices free of 
patriarchal and other cultural pressures, is also seen to reduce the sense of a need for children as 
future family support in old age.  
   This double appeal to increased prosperity and women’s rights and welfare has been 
nicknamed the Cairo Consensus, 12 after the UN conference on population at Cairo in 1994 
where previously coercive forms of population control were rejected in favour of a focus on 
issues of individual reproductive rights.  The Cairo consensus can seem an ethically bewildering 
scenario, an expansion of the individual rights agenda that few would see as unwelcome, 
however evasive of overpopulation as a macro-social concern, but also a reformulation 
population issues in limitedly individualistic terms that help underwrite the ecocidal and self-
conflictual capitalist super-state now emergent across the globe.  Appeals to a future 
‘demographic transition’ in Africa and elsewhere also evade the moral duty of ‘developed’ 
nations themselves to reduce their environmental impact. 13  
    A recurrent danger for the world’s societies in addressing longer term environmental trends is 
that of inter-generational buck-passing, the endorsing of environmental policies whose apparent 
engagement masks the fact of their longer-term inadequacy, thus foisting large costs and impacts 
onto future generations. Many appeals to a ‘demographic transition’ are effectively gestures of 
this type. Stephen Gardiner writes: 
 
Strong coercive regulatory regimes may be needed in order to stop overpollution, and so to 
address the pressing problem suggested by population growth. Second, the benign demographic 
transition hypothesis should be treated with suspicion. 14   
 
In sum, by letting standard arguments on the ‘demographic transition’ circulate without 
comment, many environmental thinkers are avoiding a crucial issue.     
 
       (3) Thirdly, debate about how the planet’s biosphere might accommodate a growing human 
population always change drastically in nature if one drops their often total disregard for the 
needs and ethical claims of other species. Books like Danny Dorling’s Population 10 Billion 
strike their supposedly reassuring stance on population future land-use by assuming an exclusive 
human entitlement to the planet. A repellent anthropocentrism also marks most advocates of the 
supposed virtues of the ‘demographic transition’.  
 
The Insidious Elusiveness of Overpopulation. 
 
Within the humanities the long-orthodox view is that, as an environmental threat, the topic of 
overpopulation mainly represents an ideological ploy by which, through a rhetoric of natural 
limits, the poor are themselves rendered responsible for deprivation or environmental 
degradation. ‘Overpopulation’ is immediately associated with the arguments, often 
misrepresented, of the early nineteenth-century cleric Thomas Malthus. Andreu Domingo sums 
up: 
 
 For Malthusian orthodoxy, defended by [fictional] dystopias that play on and heighten the fear 
of population explosion, scarcity is not a problem of production and distribution of goods, but a 
simple consequence of too many people (Domingo, 731) 
 
     Timothy Morton’s The Ecological Thought is exemplary of the stance of ecocritics on 
overpopulation. Morton takes up and dismisses the issue of overpopulation briefly, simply 
identifying it with the popular Malthusianism of the 1970s and after. 15 Currently, the issue of 
overpopulation can function in ecocritical contexts as a kind of Rorschach test. Whereas a reader 
who stresses elements of ‘ecology’ in a text is held to serve a moral cause, one highlighting 
‘overpopulation’ is immediately suspect, a latent racist, fascist, imperialist or whatever. 
    Yet the challenge of overpopulation is caricatured if merely identified with popular 
Malthusianism. It is better if less simply seen as the fraught, complex effect of improved health 
conditions, inherited cultures of reproduction, and economic pressures, including lack of 
security. Correspondingly, the negative impacts of overpopulation are also not those of crass 
Malthusianism, but rather a hybrid of various dangers and impacts. Already risking 
simplification, these can be schematised as follows.  
   (1)  Acknowledging that overpopulation is a legitimate issue, though often a tool for evasive 
scapegoating, Bryan G. Norton writes that ‘population growth cannot be considered an 
independent driver of the social changes that result in environmental degradation’ (emphasis 
added). 16 The operative nuance here is the term ‘independent’, for population is better 
considered as a catalyst than an independent factor. The presence of a catalyst is decisive as to 
whether a chemical reaction happens or not, but it is the other elements which determine what 
that reaction is. Analogously, overpopulation intensifies the ravages of capitalist exploitation, but 
it is not capitalism itself. A high population multiplies/transforms what might seem merely 
cultural change into a significant material and even global one -- the growth of meat eating in 
China, taken as a mark of social prestige, becomes, through the vast population multiplier, the 
loss of large areas of the earth to destructive forms of animal husbandry. Workers in 
environmental criticism who idealise the value of their work in terms of the effects that must 
result from changing the ‘environmental imaginary’ are also appealing to the assumed 
transformative power of very large populations.  
    (2). Overpopulation as an issue is often controversial because so chameleonic, appearing as a 
very different matter depending on the scalar context at issue. The three main scales at which the 
issue is usually posed are the national, the individual and the global, and these both differ greatly 
in implication but also interfere with each other. (a) Let us take scale framing at the national 
level first. Writing in the critical anthology Life on the Brink, Tim Palmer writes of his career in 
river conservation in the US. He argues that each success in doubling the efficiency of water use 
per individual had been rendered null by increased population. ‘In the end we will not have 
protected wild rivers, spared endangered species, or saved public money as we had intended, but 
we will have principally served to make more population growth possible’. 17 Palmer also 
relates how a long hard-fought campaign against a new freeway was successful -- but only till 
increased population made the pressure to reduce ‘congestion’ overwhelming. So ‘The freeway 
was built’ (98).  
    However, Palmer’s essay in Life on the Brink becomes, like several in this American 
collection, an argument for curbing immigration into the United States, a different issue 
altogether from that of global overpopulation. An argument relating increasing population 
pressure and the undermining of campaigns of environmental conservation would seem 
incontrovertible if applied to the earth as a whole. To relate it to the issue of how human 
numbers are distributed into specific national areas, however, is effectively to change the subject, 
exemplifying the kind of national scale framing that has made demography often so politically 
dubious.  
    Palmer’s case may also highlight another reason why overpopulation so rarely appears in 
Western ecocriticism. A critic in the United States who, in order to avoid being seen to make 
pronouncements about population politics in other cultures, decides to focus on her own nation’s 
population impact, would at once be embroiled in debates about immigration as well. 
 
     (b) A more challenging scale framing is that at the level of the individual. It was recognised at 
the UN Cairo conference that official policies on overpopulation had all too often been 
responsible for systematic injustice against many individuals, especially women.  
     Betsy Hartmann’s classic denunciation of the sexism and misogyny latent in measures of 
population control makes a case for framing issues of reproductive politics solely, even 
exclusively, at the level of the rights of each individual woman. She observes that anti-abortion 
campaigners and attitudes and advocates of population control, seemingly at odds with each 
other, yet ‘share one thing in common’: 
 
They are both anti-women. Population control advocates impose contraception and sterilization 
on women; the so-called Right-to-Life movement denies women the basic right of access to 
abortion and birth-control. Neither takes the interests and rights of the individual woman as their 
starting point. 18  
 
The first section of Hartmann’s book (‘The Real Population Problem’) targets varieties of 
Malthusian argument and later sections argue for the priority and ‘inviolability of individual 
reproductive rights’ (xviii) in any debate about overpopulation. Scale-framing at the individual 
level is also the commonest form of treatment in literary representations of overpopulation—
depictions of the individual experience of overcrowding or, more directly, Ma Jian’s account in 
Dark Road of one women’s persecution under the then current  Chinese One-Child Policy, or, in 
many an overcrowded fictional dystopia with draconian anti-natal laws, the trials of a woman  
who discovers herself to be pregnant (as with the heroine of Anthony Burgess’s The Wanting 
Seed (1962)). 19  
    However, as Coole writes, dismissals of the ‘numbers game’ picture of humanity en masse 
which scale-frame the population question as a matter of individual and family options, 
effectively ‘disintegrate’ the issue ‘(‘Too many bodies’, 209), rendering out of sight or 
consideration of overpopulation as a global pressure. A crucial factor here is that of 
‘methodological individualism’ viz. the postulate that there are no properties of human, social 
groups that cannot be understood adequately and exclusively by reference to the properties of 
individuals. Hartmann’s framing of the overpopulation issue as an ethical matter of individual 
right is analogous to this postulate. Yet it also, antagonistically, forms an intellectual pillar of 
neoliberal economics and politics, with their ideologies of individual choice and ‘free markets’.  
Carol A. Kates weighs arguments about reproductive right and finds the liberal, individual rights 
discourse dubious in this context, given that too absolute an insistence on individual right now 
conflicts with others’ more fundamental rights to sufficient conditions for human life. 20  
    Overpopulation also undermines methodological individualism because of scale effects: the 
impact of more and more people in relation to some area or issue is not a matter of the merely 
aggregative extension of given individual impacts. The catalysing destructiveness of increased 
numbers is often an emergent property (a ‘tipping point’) -- vast areas can become devastated by 
changes resulting from population growth in just one city, along with newly demanding levels of 
complexity in administration, politics, distribution, transport systems etc..   
    (c) The elusiveness of overpopulation as a global issue is that it does not exist as a unitary 
phenomenon. While the overall impact of overpopulation is felt world-wide, the term itself, like 
the term ‘Anthropocene’ in cultural debate, remains a shorthand for multiple and contradictory 
issues and an opaque complexity.  In any one country, advocates for population restraint will 
have bewilderingly diverse set of aims. These may be: economic development (as argued during 
the emergence of China’s One Child policy); an end to immigration; women’s rights; forms of 
closet racism or social prejudice, nature conservation….         
            Jacques Derrida wrote, defining a concept of an ‘event’ as intellectual trauma: 
 
 A major event should be so unforeseeable and irruptive that it disturbs even the horizon of the 
concept or essence on the basis of which we believe we recognize an event as such … the event 
is first of all that I do not comprehend. 21  
 
In relation to the event of overpopulation on the global scale, one would also seek to fine-tune 
this definition. Firstly, overpopulation is not unforeseeable. As David Wood has written of global 
environmental degradation, it requires us to acknowledge an ethical demand that ‘does not begin 
on the other side of calculation, but is already intimately involved in it’. 22 Secondly, there is no 
‘an event’ in the sense of a unitary irruption, but only, in each varying individual or national 
instance, the uncertain, always contestably chameleonic implication of various impacts, each 
caught up in scale effects imperceptible as significant in any one case, dispersal being their 
nature. Intellectually, with global overpopulation as an environmental issue, the ‘event’ is partly 
that there is no ‘the real problem’ as such, but multiple and never fully localisable 
contaminations and catalytic factors feeding various environmental pressures. The causes of 
expanding human numbers  are likewise multiple -- cultures of reproduction, insecurity and 
impoverishment through destructively industrialised systems of agriculture, ‘economic growth’ 
and expanding consumer markets, international rivalries, improved health care.  
 
   Each of the three levels of scale framing overpopulation can so easily support a view evading 
of the issues raised by the others. If you scale frame the issue at the level of the individual 
woman or man you may be predetermined to evade other questions (the evidence that there are 
too many people, already, a very large number of them young); to frame it at the level of the 
nation state is also evasive of global overpopulation, as well as leading into the divisive and 
arguably irrelevant issue of immigration. Yet to engage the issue at the global level is to entail a 
complexity that strains to breaking point accessible representation, or any kind of monolithic 
diagnosis. 
  
  
Overpopulation: Literary Representation at Breaking Point 
  
    As an issue for literature and criticism, demography entails phenomena often too big to be 
seen. They form a kind of meta-context, enabling the conditions in which the institutions of a 
national literature can emerge in the first place, with all the readers, writers and critics, 
publishers, literate markets etc. which sustain it. For instance, what would ‘Argentinian 
literature’ or ‘Australian literature’ be without the imperialist demographic politics of the 19th 
and 20th centuries, programmes of settler colonization that shifted millions people from Europe? 
Furthermore, could one honestly separately the prestige and influence of centuries of literature in 
English from the large numbers of native speakers of that language now alive, as compared to 
the fate of great literature written in a language that relatively few people can read? 
    Population is, like the climate, both a completely obvious yet usually unconsidered context for 
any literary work. Correspondingly, global overpopulation has some of the elusive features that 
have made climate change so intractable to conceptualise as an object of cultural or political 
representation, and the two issues often merge into one maddeningly imponderable hybrid. It 
takes place on a time scale of generations, and the connections, when they even exist, between 
causal responsibility and moral responsibility are complex, disjunctive in space or time and often 
contestable. It is never perceptible as such, for population elsewhere in the world is not 
obviously perceptible from any one area (though images of city crowds have often acted as a 
synecdoche for the global question). Its apparent partial manifestations can be deceptive –a 
crowded city in Africa may well have less environmental impact than a small town in Canada. 
Another analogy is that, just as one daily face of environmentally destructive fossil fuel use is 
domestic comfort, time-saving utilities etc., so the immediate manifestation of overpopulation is 
of no seeming enemy of humankind but the faces of babies and children. Finally, if more tacitly 
than fossil fuel use, an ever-growing population is deeply implicit in the cult of economic growth 
and in national power and influence. 
     Demographic issues pervade current cultural self-understandings while rarely being 
conceptualised as such. One exception is the term ‘baby boomer’ (people born loosely in the 
post-WW 2 baby boom (c. 1946-1964)), now widely if loosely used in accounts of  conditions 
for the rise of ‘youth culture’ and attendant changes.  
    Under-examined assumptions about population on the national scale underlie some seemingly 
common sense methods of criticism. An extremely common way of proceeding in the 
interpretation of novels is this:  the critic takes up some chosen text to highlight how specific 
issues of culture or identity play out within it, usually suggesting this particular text as offering 
some sort of explanatory critique, satire, model or norm.  At the basis of such a cultural reading 
is a constitutive notion of representativeness, viz. a particular fictional woman’s story is taken as 
saying something in general about many women’s lives in that society; or, the life-story of a 
fictional poor person implies the recognition of millions of poor nationally, and so on. The basic 
trope of critical interpretation is correspondingly a scaling-up, that is, to highlight the book as 
enacting in fictional miniature a cultural political drama that could be held usefully to apply, 
scaled-up, on the national level. That this is how so many novels are written and read may seem 
too obvious to need stating, yet an undertheorised and unquantified notion of representativeness 
and population is at the basis of it. 
    Such assumptions about population, constitutive of the argument though they are, are rarely 
made explicit in such readings. An exception is E. Steinlight’s reading of the representation of 
female characters who stand for ‘surplus national population’ of women in the mid and late 
Victorian ‘sensation’ novel  -- the figure of Lady Audley in Mary Elizabeth Braddon’s Lady 
Audley’s Secret (1862) 23 for instance, who, beneath the manipulative appearance of an alluring 
genteel femininity, is actually a ruthless social-climber, bigamist,  and murderer. In this one 
invented character, in herself improbable, the novel is read as representing pervasive anxieties 
about social fluidity, the insecurity of clear class and gender roles in an amorphous national 
population, including the large number of ‘redundant’ women. 24 One problem with such realist 
metonymy as a mode of representation is that anxieties concerning national trends and 
possibilities, once scaled down into the psychology and actions of one character, stretch the 
limits of psychological realism in the specific case, with Lady Audley becoming a figure of 
strikingly grotesque monstrousness.     
     In Steinlight, and in critical work on numerous texts since the mid-19th century, the boundary 
that determines representativeness is the nation state. The assumed context of a sizable, bounded 
national population, shared by critic, author and implied reader, is what tacitly gives significance 
and cultural reference to the characters in a text.  Yet, this way of reading, though still very 
prominent, is also anachronistic. Fredric Jameson argues of work even from the early twentieth 
century that realist or even modernist modes of representation were no longer adequate in a 
world in which the nation state could no longer be imagined setting relatively determinate 
boundaries of significance, implication and impact. Writing of modernist techniques of deep 
narrative immersion in the consciousness of a city such as London, ‘a tiny corner of a social 
world’ he argues: 
 
The truth of that experience no longer coincides with the place in which it takes place. The truth 
of that limited daily experience of London lies, rather, in India or Jamaica or Hong Kong: it is 
bound up with the whole colonial system of the British Empire that determines the very quality 
of the individual’s subjective life. 25  
 
The fact of global overpopulation exacerbates this problem of fictional representativeness to a 
new and perturbing degree:  incalculable, virtual multitudes of distant, diverse and often 
impoverished people now hover, so to speak, in the air of even the most secluded Western-style 
interior.  Future generations and deprivation become a morally unavoidable question for present 
readings. Their questioning presence discredits, for example, readings of contemporary or 
twentieth century literature that simply endorse the material and individualist norms of the 
developed world.   
     What of attempts to artistic represent overpopulation directly? Global overpopulation is not a 
unitary entity, isolable as such, but a catalytic element, inseparable from diverse other issues, and 
one whose force inheres in the impersonality of scale effects. As a consequence, its literary 
representation in some sensuously, perceptual form can only of some local effect, in scenes 
either knowingly partial, or symbolic.  It becomes a strange instance of a real-world, important 
issue whose would-be representation must tend to modes of writing associated with the irrealism 
or even the fantastic, the correlates of modes of attention associated with mere ‘genre fiction’. 
Adam Trexler’s arguments, in relation to the novel and climate change, against critics’ aesthetic 
bias towards modes of individualised realism and depictions of individual psychological subtlety, 
are also pertinent here. The counter-advocacy of genre fiction, by Trexler and Mark McGurl, 
arises from the sense that the aesthetic                  canons of the realist novel are now damagingly 
anachronistic. 26 If genre fiction ‘names those literary forms willing to risk artistic ludicrousness 
in their representation of the inhumanly large and long’, 27 then it follows that enquiry is needed 
into the assumptions and effects of what currently counts as artistic, non-ludicrous, authentic, 
and so on.   
 
     For one can hardly say that overpopulation is not prominent, nor a cliché even, in forms of 
dystopian art, film and literature of the last fifty years, even as it has almost disappeared as a 
serious issue for academic criticism.  These dystopian projects demonstrate how attempts to 
think demography on the grand scale, as an independent issue, entail modes of writing that risk 
seeming immediately caricature. The inherently distributed nature of longer-term demographic 
issues  may result in an irrealist condensation or inflation  of events or trends into one fantastic 
event or plot, as in P.D. James’s The Children of Men (1992) 28  in which humanity suddenly 
becomes infertile, and no  more babies at all are born to replenish an ever aging world, or in 
Amin Maalouf’s  The First Century After Beatrice (1992; trans.1993), 29  which imagines  the 
development of a drug for men that guarantees that any child they father will be male, a drug that 
proves all-too popular in a misogynist societies  and which is projected to be irreversible in 
effect. In such plots the slow-motion and distributed nature of demographic effects, whether of 
an aging population or a preference for male progeny, take on a cartoon-like extremism, whereas 
the often insidious power of demographic change actually lies in its dispersed, gradual, low-
visibility, its  contamination or catalytic supplementation of innumerable other questions and 
areas of life.  
   Moreover, many of these fictional dystopias are finally evasive of the challenges of the 
overpopulation as it currently exists. A familiar plot device is to extrapolate current trends into 
future worlds with draconian anti-natal laws or severe restrictions on space or mobility (see, for 
instance, Anthony Burgess, The Wanting Seed; Brian Aldiss, Earthworks (1965), 30 J.G. 
Ballard, ‘Billenium’ (1961); 31 Philip José Farmer, Dayward (1985); 32 T.J. Bass, Half Past 
Human (1971) 33 ).  Such plots both (1) seem to highlight contemporary  demographic and other 
trends, usually on rather vague terms that simplify the implication of demography in every facet 
of contemporary life, and (2), to project a narrative in which the drama for the reader lies, not in 
thinking through the nature of overpopulation,  but in the criminality of characters who work to 
reduce human numbers in unacceptable ways, with conspiracies to reduce the population, or 
selected parts of it,  by deliberately induced plague, sterilization or impoverishment (as in  
Chelsea Quinn Yarbo’s Time of the Fourth Horseman (1976), 34 or Marshall Goldberg and 
Kenneth Kay’s  Disposable People (1980), 35 George Reginald Turner’s The Sea and Summer 
(1987), 36 Lionel Shriver’s Game Control (1994), 37 or Colin Macpherson’s The Tide Turners 
(1999)). 38 Alternatively, these texts  indulge fantastic solutions to population pressures (alien 
intervention in Sheri S. Tepper; 39 enhanced human evolution  in Joanna Russ’s And Chaos 
Died (1970)).40 All such plots offer ways of both having your cake and eating it: they raise a 
contemporary issue of population growth and then, instead of conceptualizing it more fully, they 
extrapolate it into a dystopian scenario whose extremisms then become objects of repulsion and 
rejection according to current moral norms. As to present day demography, the overall 
implication of such texts remains only of a vague something-needing-to-be-done. 41  
      A final point suggests itself. Global overpopulation tends to become a topic largely in modes 
of fictional representation that make it less likely to be taken seriously as an issue for critical 
discussion.  In this respect the topic may highlight human biological limits, not in the Malthusian 
sense however, but in that of our relative psychic entrapment in the spatial and temporal scales of 
day -to-day experience. Neuro or cognitive criticism--the use of neurological research and 
cognitive science in literary study — offers a   compelling set of arguments to the effect that 
scale-framing at the (limited) level of individual, subjective experience is constitutive of literary 
representations at their most forceful or memorable. This inbuilt bias is highlighted even by 
Sharae Deckard’s defense of a notion of ‘world literature’ when she writes: 
 
As the social form of capitalist modernity, literature necessarily registers the ecological regimes 
that constitute the world-ecology, revealing the structures of feeling, affects, bodily dispositions, 
and lived experiences that correspond to particular socio-ecological relations. 42 
 
In such a case, an issue such as global overpopulation, often exceeding individual-scale  factors 
such as ‘structures of feeling, affects, bodily dispositions, and lived experiences’, will   
necessarily be subject to elision or to very partial or mis- representation, or become apparent 
largely in modes of fictional representation that make it less likely to be taken seriously as an 
issue for discussion.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
    The almost complete evasion of issues of population in environmental literary criticism 
damages its claim to be taken seriously as an intellectual movement. The absence may arise from 
that fact that ‘overpopulation’ as a concern is discordant with dominant notions of ‘ecology’, 
romanticised and moralised as affirming a knowledge of ‘interconnection’ and ‘interaction’ 
taken as automatically affirming  an agenda of mutual recognition and help (‘All things connect 
and cannot escape into separation’ (Steve Menz )). 43 ‘Overpopulation’ describes the same fact 
of ‘interconnection,’ but without the   moral gloss. It foregrounds the unpalatable fact that 
environmental understanding leads at least as easily to aggression, blame and resource wars. It 
remains the largely unacknowledged shadow of the limited ‘ecological’ ethics at the basis of 
numerous readings of culture and the environment. However, to acknowledge the horrible ethical 
complexities that beset questions of population pressure, the multiple, contradictory nature of its 
‘event’, is surely preferable to pretending the issue does not exist. 
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